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Tracking Presidents and Policies: Environmental Politics from Lula to Dilma 
 
Kathryn Hochstetler, London School of Economics 
 
 
 
Abstract: Does the Brazilian presidential system shape environmental policy there? The 
comparative literature on environmental policy offers few reasons to think that it might. 
Most explanations of variations in the quantity and quality of environmental regulation 
stress levels of economic development or move outside of the nation- state to examine 
international processes of diffusion and convergence. Other studies look at large 
macrostructural differences like the contrast between democratic and authoritarian 
systems and/or the role of non-state actors. This article examines environmental policies 
and outcomes in three successive presidential administrations in Brazil to develop 
hypotheses about whether institutional factors should gain a larger place in comparative 
studies of environmental policies and outcomes.  
This work was supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada under a Standard Research Grant.  
 
 
Introduction 
 What factors explain policy outcomes in different issue areas? This special issue 
focuses on Brazil and spotlights the possible role of presidentialism – both the generic 
institution and its Brazilian variants – in answering this question. The basic logic stresses 
that presidentialism gives a single individual a great deal of power and democratic 
legitimacy. Especially when presidential systems, like Brazil’s, lack significant checks 
and balances from other branches of government, this should produce policy outcomes 
that closely follow the president’s own public policy agenda and/or that of the coalition 
partners on whom the president relies. Translated into an expectation for environmental 
policy, the focus of this article, it suggests that environmental policies and outcomes may 
well shift quite a bit with incoming administrations. The shifts should be traceable to 
presidents’ visions and their governing strategies. 
 These expectations are quite different from those of most studies of comparative 
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environmental policy. In those, the most common drivers of environmental policy are 
found outside of national political institutions and individuals. Scholars often identify 
levels of economic development as a critical line of delineation (Sommerer and Lim 
2016: 93-94) or focus on the presence of democracy versus authoritarianism (Midlarsky 
1998). Environmental policy is also often thought to follow its own dynamics of 
expansion through international diffusion and adoption processes (e.g., Duit 2016). While 
authors stress that backtracking is possible, the general image is of a complex policy area 
that normally accretes policies in a cumulative way over time that is less responsive to 
changes of administration than to technical developments and the pushing of non-state 
actors from scientists to activists (Fahey and Pralle 2016). 
 The next section of the article develops these expectations further, with particular 
reference to Brazil. After this, I examine the environmental policy area in three recent 
presidential administrations there: President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva’s first (2003-2006) 
and second (2007-2010) terms and President Dilma Rousseff’s first term (2011-2014). I 
show that each of these terms did have a markedly different character in terms of 
environmental policy and outcomes, although the differences among the Ministers of 
Environment were as important as those among the Presidents themselves. At the same 
time, it is not clear that the scale of the differences would register in many comparative 
studies of environmental politics, suggesting a disjuncture between the analytical aims of 
these two kinds of policy studies. I return to this point in the conclusion. 
Presidents and Policy: A Review with Reference to Environmental Policy 
 As just noted, most comparative discussions of environmental policy do not 
envision a significant explanatory role for institutional dimensions like presidentialism. 
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In this policy area, many studies look beyond nation-states to emphasize global processes 
of diffusion and emulation (e.g., Duit 2016; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; 
Sommerer and Lim 2016: 94). These studies often emphasize the role of leader 
institutions and international norms in spreading innovative regulatory frameworks. For 
example, the World Bank helped to disseminate practices like regular environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) of new economic projects (Wade 1997). The technical quality 
of environmental policy, which relies heavily on scientific disciplines and agreed 
regulatory approaches (Haas 1990), sets it apart from other issue areas, in this view. 
 When scholars examine the national level, there is a strong presumption (albeit 
with inconclusive evidence) that levels of economic development are important for 
explaining environmental policy and outcomes (Fahey and Praline 2016: S32; Purdon 
2015; Sommerer and Lim 2016: 93-94; Stern 2004). The evidence is inconclusive in part 
because so little research has been done outside the advanced industrial democracies. In 
terms of institutions, scholars have tended to look at quite broad institutional choices, like 
the impact of democracy versus authoritarianism in explaining environmental outcomes 
(Midlarsky 1998). More specific institutional choices, like presidentialism versus 
parliamentarism, are not considered important. One recent review of the growth of 
environmental regulation, in fact, concluded that there was no overlap between “most 
other comparative classification schemes” and the level of national environmental 
commitment (Duit 2016: 87) and others agree (e.g., Houle, Lachapelle, and Purdon 2015; 
Scruggs 1999).  
 All of these approaches tend to see environmental policy as cumulative and 
linearly advancing – as values and models are diffused, as countries develop, when they 
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become democratic – in a way that is hard to square with the presidentialism literature’s 
image of policy arenas that are quickly responsive to the ambitions and coalition building 
strategies of individual presidents. Still, there is some possible basis for expecting the 
arrangements of presidentialism to matter, given the “political opportunity” approaches 
that have been widely used to explain the roles of non-state actors (e.g., Kitschelt 1986), 
since they are so important for the environmental issue area. In addition, almost all of the 
studies of institutions focus on the advanced industrialized democracies, and it is possible 
that such studies “reinforce assumptions about professionalized legislatures and 
bureaucracies that might not apply to less developed areas of the world” (Fahey and 
Praline 2016: S32), including Brazil. 
 In fact, most observers of Brazilian politics see a highly politicized bureaucracy 
and legislature there and an outsized role of the national president in shaping political 
outcomes. As the introduction to this special issue and its other papers show, the size of 
this role is in some ways derivative of the normal characteristics of presidential systems, 
since a directly elected head of state and government almost inevitably gains tremendous 
power and discretion. Heads of the bureaucracy serve at the pleasure of the president and 
so should be an especially direct transmission belt for presidential ambitions (Linz 1990), 
although secondary characteristics of presidential systems like the number of political 
parties and other veto players also affect policy outcomes (Haggard and McCubbins 
2001; Mainwaring 1993).  
 These characteristics of presidentialism are exaggerated in what has been called 
the hyperpresidentialism of Brazil, where the other branches of government are 
comparatively weak and generally present few checks and balances (Mainwaring 1993). 
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Brazil’s dozens of programmatically weak political parties have required Brazilian 
presidents to be deft coalition managers, but – if they are – they can then use those 
coalitions to deliver their desired outcomes in first passing laws and then implementing 
them (Amorim Neto 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; Pereira, Power, and Renno 
2005). This would reinforce the expectation that policy should follow presidential visions 
in Brazil. A president strongly committed to environmental policy should be able to push 
new regulations and strengthen environmental institutions, while an uncommitted 
president might promote economic development at the expense of environmental 
protections and roll back environmental regulations and institutions.  
 Yet the coalitional basis of Brazilian presidentialism means that the 
environmental policy arena complicates governing for all presidents, even if they 
personally want to promote environmental protection. In Brazil’s coalitional 
presidentialism, ministries are allocated to political parties in order to shore up their 
support for the political agenda of the president. Budgetary clientelism, or pork, is a 
complementary tool used for ongoing coalition management, as individuals are offered 
targeted benefits for their legislative support; a number of the parties that have made up 
most governing coalitions demand such pork for their support (Ames 2001; Mueller 
2010: 112; Power 2010: 28-29; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011: 324). Yet the Ministry of 
Environment frequently delays or, more rarely, blocks the targeted infrastructure projects 
that are a favorite tool for rewarding legislative support (Amorim Neto and Simonassi 
2013; Hochstetler and Tranjan 2016). It may do so on its own or when prodded by 
environmental activists through protests or by working with actors like the Ministério 
Público, a powerful and independent public prosecutor.  
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 Environmental actors have acquired this role through both institutional and more 
contingent historical pathways. The environmental issue area in Brazil is one where the 
national ministry has always closely interacted with organized civil society movements. 
Since the 1950s, much environmental expertise and engagement has rested in civil 
society groups, and individuals frequently move between state agencies and societal 
organizations in their career trajectories (Hochstetler and Keck 2007). The Ministry of 
Environment has been correspondingly comparatively open to civil society participation 
and input (Abers and Oliveira 2015; Losekann 2012). The 1981 National System of the 
Environment institutionalized this participation even under the military regime, placing 
civil society representatives on a new National Council on the Environment (Conama – 
Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente), making it one of Brazil’s first participatory 
councils (Republic of Brazil 1991). 
 Relations within the environmental sector have not always been harmonious, 
particularly when activists have worked with the Ministério Público to challenge the 
Ministry’s policies and actions in the courts. Dozens of such cases have introduced 
significant delays in environmental licenses that delay infrastructure and industrial 
projects in turn, although they are less frequent than Brazilian newspaper headlines 
would suggest (Hochstetler and Tranjan 2016). Environmental activists in Brazil have 
also historically teamed with international partners to challenge state decisions. The 
iconic boomerang strategy of transnational activist networks – where national activists 
seek international allies in international NGOs, the World Bank, and beyond to pressure 
their own governments – was in fact identified in part by observing the strategies of 
Brazilian environmentalists and rubber tappers for preserving the Amazon in the 1980s 
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(Keck 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998: Chapter 4). Foreign governments and NGOs have 
also closely monitored and even paid for Brazilian environmental politics themselves, 
with deforestation in the Amazon drawing regular attention since the 1970s (Hochstetler 
and Keck 2007). 
 The net result is that the Ministry of the Environment has always combined 
responsiveness to presidential ambitions including coalition building strategies with 
responsiveness – willing and not – to civil society and its allies, as I will show. The direct 
impact that presidents can have on environmental outcomes is mediated by how their 
Ministers of Environment strike that balance. In the next section, I discuss the three 
Ministers of the Environment who served under the Workers Party (PT, Partido dos 
Trabalhadores) from 2003 to 2014. Following that, I trace the unfolding developments in 
the environmental licensing area since 2003, the place where the Ministry’s 
responsibilities most directly counterpoise the imperatives of political pork and 
environmental protection. 
The National Environmental Bureaucracy and its Ministers 
 Brazil was one of the few Latin American countries to create a national 
environmental bureaucracy in the 1970s, in full military government. Long time 
conservationist Paulo Nogueira Neto was tapped to be the first Special Secretary of the 
Environment, serving from 1973 to 1985. The institution he led had just three employees 
and almost no budget at its origin, but immediately faced off with the most powerful 
ministries, of economics and foreign affairs (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 27-29). The 
national Secretariat also shared the policy space with both very strong (Rio de Janeiro 
and São Paulo) and notably weak (everywhere else) state agencies (Hochstetler and Keck 
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2007: 14-15), as well as newly contentious environmental movements who even 
challenged cherished military projects (Antuniassi, Magdalena, and Giansanti 1989). 
 All of these became hallmarks of the environmental policy area in Brazil. The 
number of personnel grew substantially – to 6230 employees by 1989 – but budgeted 
project spending was cut year after year (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 36; 40-42). From 
1995 to 2002, not a single new position was advertised, and by the end of the period, 
most personnel and projects were handled with short-term contracts (Abers and Oliveira 
2015: 17). In a national budget that has many political and statutory rigidities, 
environmental spending is one of the few areas that can be cut to meet budget targets 
(Mueller 2010). Even though the agency was raised to ministerial status as early as 1985, 
the institutions were reshuffled so frequently that little institutionalization was possible 
(Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 38-39). The first Cardoso government added water 
resources to the portfolio to make it attractive to the PFL as a coalition partner, since 
water resources (90% of the ministry budget) held some scope for pork in the form of 
irrigation and other water projects (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 10).
1
 Once those parts were 
removed and the agency became simply the Ministry of Environment (Ministério do 
Meio Ambiente) in 1999, it settled into a more stable period as a second-line ministry, a 
minor part of the partisan horse-trading of coalition formation. 
 As a result of these developments, nearly all of the Ministers of the Environment 
have had significant environmental profiles before moving into the position, with more 
mixed partisan backgrounds. The last three occupants of the position are good 
illustrations of these dimensions of the environmental issue area. While two of them were 
                                                 
11
 Interview with Jair Sarmento, then Director of CONAMA and Executive Secretary, 
Ministry of the Environment, Brasília, 4 August 1999. 
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members and elected politicians for the PT before they were appointed, they also have 
been associated with environmental parties and movements. The third is a technocrat who 
rose within the Ministry of Environment to head it. 
 Lula’s first appointment to head the Ministry of Environment was Marina Silva. 
Silva (no relation to the president) has a compelling personal biography, having been 
raised in a rubber tapper family in the Amazonian state of Acre. She worked closely with 
historic figures in Amazonian environmental politics like Chico Mendes, whose murder 
in 1988 made international headlines (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 1-2). She learned to 
read only as a teenager, but then built on her background of rural activism and personal 
charisma to become the first black woman and first rubber tapper elected to the Senate in 
1994 (Nunes and Peña 2015: 506-507). She subsequently led the PT delegation and the 
larger opposition to the governing PSDB in the Senate during Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso’s presidencies (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 1; Oliveira 2016). Environmental 
activists had lobbied to have her as minister, and followed her to the ministry. They held 
38% of Silva’s leadership positions in the ministry, while 22% of the positions went to 
members of the PT (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 10, 19). In short, Silva had strong 
environmental as well as partisan credentials to be the PT’s first Minister of the 
Environment. 
 Silva is a proponent of the socioenvironmental claim that environmental aims can 
only be achieved with attention to social claims as well (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 13; 
Viana, Silva, and Diniz 2001). She was a particularly active and successful minister, 
placing special emphasis on the institutional foundations of the ministry and addressing 
deforestation (Abers and Oliveira 2015). On the former, she worked to improve the 
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environmental bureaucracy, creating a specialized environmental career path for public 
servants for the first time and hiring 1474 of them in five years through public 
competitions (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 17). Silva also staunchly defended her technical 
staff against other ministries and the politicized environment of licensing.
2
 On the latter, 
she oversaw a suite of policies that led to an unprecedented steep drop in deforestation in 
the Amazon after 2005 (see Figure 1). Like other successful environmental policies, this 
result derived from policies aimed at conservation in its own right along with non-
governmental initiatives like transnational consumer boycotts of products grown on 
deforested land that motivated agriculturalists to join the effort to protect their markets 
(Arima et al. 2015; Boucher, Roquemore, and Fitzhugh 2013; Gibbs, et al. 2015; 
Schwartzman, Moutinho, and Hamburg 2012). Recognizing the weakness of the 
Ministry, Silva persuaded Lula to have the policies promulgated through the Civic House 
(Casa Civil), a key institution of the presidency for domestic politics – although an 
environmental activist, João Paulo Capobianco, designed the heart of the policy, before 
he joined the Ministry (Oliveira 2016). 
 As Minister of Environment, Silva was frequently caught between an 
environmental base that expected larger achievements from her and a broad coalition of 
political and economic actors who minimized the importance of environmental 
considerations (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 178-180). The latter included many in the PT 
who wanted to deliver industrialization and economic growth to their constituencies and 
chafed against the delays and even barriers of environmental licensing and other 
regulations. These conflicts sharpened in Lula’s second term, which saw a major, state-
                                                 
2
 Interview with former technical staff member of the environmental licensing agency, 
IBAMA, Brasília, June 2009. 
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funded push to support new large infrastructure projects, agribusiness, and recent oil 
discoveries (Hochstetler and Montero 2013). Silva eventually resigned over these 
tensions in 2008, at the beginning of Lula’s second term, taking some of her new 
environmentalist hires with her (Oliveira 2016). Although she was a founder of the PT in 
Acre, she left the party in 2009 to run against its candidate, Rousseff, in the 2010 
presidential election on the Green Party (PV, Partido Verde) ticket. The PV had been part 
of the PT’s governing coalition until that point. Silva won a surprising 20% of the vote in 
the first presidential election round in 2010, and roughly matched that result in 2014 on 
the Brazilian Socialist Party label after trying and failing to form a wholly new party 
(Abers and Oliveira 2015: 15-16; Nunes and Peña 2015:  507-509; Oliveira 2016).  
 Lula replaced Silva with Carlos Minc, whose trajectory as an urban environmental 
activist and leader was as long as Silva’s rural one. Minc was one of a group of “amnesty 
environmentalists” who were exiled to Europe in the military years for their guerrilla 
opposition to the military. They returned with political amnesty in 1979 and helped to 
form the PT two years later, biding their time until they could form the PV at the end of 
the 1980s. Minc returned to the PT a few years later, claiming that the PV relied too 
much on a small group of leaders (Hochstetler and Keck 2007: 89-93). In subsequent 
years, he held a number of positions in Rio de Janeiro state and municipal politics, both 
as an elected representative and heading the environmental bureaucracy. Throughout this 
time, Minc retained an activist orientation, taking part in anti-nuclear mobilizations and 
writing a didactic text on how to form an environmental movement (Minc 1985). In an 
interview he granted while minister, he reminisced about how his approach to air 
pollution had shifted from shoving potatoes into the exhaust pipes of trucks to more 
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standard monitoring of emissions and finally campaigns to improve fuel.
3
 Thus Minc, 
like Silva, had both partisan and environmental roots, although his leadership group in 
the Ministry of Environment included notably fewer appointments for environmental 
activists, academics, and others outside the new career civil service tracks (Abers and 
Oliveira 2015: 20). 
 Minc faced the same second-term tensions as Silva had, exacerbated by the global 
financial crisis and Brazil’s brief sinking into recession.  Given the choice between 
steadily confronting ministries and coalitional allies seeking roads and electricity plants 
or lowering his environmental aims, he often eventually capitulated – albeit following 
heated altercations with the Ministries of Transport, Energy, and Agrarian Reform.
4
 
Environmentalists were glad to see him leave in 2010 to run for the state legislature in 
Rio de Janeiro, and published several documents about the environmental losses in his 
administration (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 13). Deforestation continued to fall during 
Minc’s term in office, however, one of several important developments that resulted in 
Brazil’s first national legislation on climate change and international commitments to 
reduce climate emissions at the end of 2009 (Hochstetler and Viola 2012). His policies in 
these areas largely continued those of Marina Silva. 
 Minc had named Izabella Teixeira, a technical employee in Ibama since the 
1980s, to be his Secretary General. She was then elevated to be the Interim Minister of 
Environment when Minc left, and has been Minister of Environment in Rousseff’s 
administrations. Teixeira has held numerous positions with the ministry and is respected 
                                                 
3
 http://www.cntdespoluir.org.br/Lists/Contedos/DispForm.aspx?ID=1547, accessed 6 
June, 2009. 
4
 See, for example, Folha de São Paulo 10 July 2009; Globo 28 December 2009. 
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for her technical and administrative skills. She holds a PhD in Energy Planning and wrote 
her dissertation on the use of Strategic Environmental Assessment in the oil and gas 
sector (Teixeira 2008). Teixeira had only weak ties to both PT and civil society actors, 
and the latter viewed her as closely aligned with the Rousseff government (Abers and 
Oliveira 2015: 15). Almost two thirds of her appointments to leadership positions were 
career public servants, deepening Minc’s turn from the partisan and civil society leaders 
Silva favored (Abers and Oliveira 2015: 22). Unlike her predecessors, Teixeira has more 
readily followed her president’s policies, and the amount of overt conflict between the 
Ministry of Environment and other ministries has dropped. Civil society, in contrast, feels 
excluded. Protesters shouted over her presentation at the Rio+20 conference and she 
shouted back at them, in a moment that showed the divide.
5
 With the Brazilian economy 
foundering and Rousseff losing political control over her own coalition, the 
environmental area has suffered losses. As Figure 1 shows, deforestation levels are no 
longer dropping. Revision of the Forest Code in 2011 and 2012 that reduced deforestation 
controls is one element of the relevant changes in policies. These revisions happened over 
Rousseff’s repeated vetoes, and news reports at the time attributed the legislative losses 
to the PMDB’s unhappiness with how few seats it held in Rousseff’s cabinet (Estado de 
São Paulo 11 June 2011). A non-governmental organization used government data to 
calculate that the budget for the Amazon protection program dropped by 72% in 
Rousseff’s first term.6 
 As this survey of recent Ministers of Environment shows, partisan coalition-
                                                 
5
 http://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/miriam-leitao/post/ministra-izabella-teixeira-em-um-
barraco-ambiental-451836.html 
6
 http://desmatamento.infoamazonia.org/analise/. 
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building has rarely been part of the selection and operation of the Ministry of 
Environment. The Ministry itself is poor in resources and ministers have been chosen for 
their expertise in the area. The two PT ministers butted heads many times with other 
ministers in the cabinet, including those from the PT. In the next section, I show how 
those tensions came to the forefront in the environmental licensing process, core to the 
regulatory approvals needed by many economic projects. 
Environmental Licensing: Pork vs. Protection 
 Doling out pork is one of the classic strategies of coalition management, and has 
been critical in Brazil’s multi-party coalitional presidentialism in particular (Raile, 
Power, and Pereira 2011). Potential and past collaborators with presidents are rewarded 
with projects for which they can claim credit with local constituencies – a paved road, a 
new port, a hydroelectric power plant, and so on. The projects provide construction and 
sometimes operations jobs, may enable other economic activity, and thus are tangible 
evidence that a politician is delivering goods for a community. One reason that ministries 
handling transportation or water are so highly valued is because they are the ministries 
that can delivered coalition goods of this kind. The projects may also carry various kinds 
of physical, environmental, or other risks, however, and can be disruptive to social and 
economic activities as well as natural habitats (Altschuler and Luberoff 2003; McAdam 
and Boudet 2012). Public consultation may result in demands for compensation for actual 
or perceived harms. In Brazil, the environmental licensing process – an attribution of the 
federal Ministry of Environment or state level agencies, depending on the scale of the 
project – finds the balance between the potential social and environmental harms and 
benefits of the process and has become a serious veto point since it was first created in 
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1986 (Landim and Sánchez 2012). 
 Environmental licensing and the environmental impact assessment (EIA) that 
forms its foundation are meant to be preventive of environmental harm. Economic 
projects that might affect the environment are to undergo early scrutiny that will identify 
possible impacts, mitigate those impacts or seek alternatives where they are available, 
and make plans to compensate for any unavoidable harms. While EIA may lead to 
projects being set aside altogether, it more commonly leads to modifications of them and 
easily delays their start as the scrutiny takes place (Hochstetler and Tranjan 2016; 
Morgan 2012) – potentially frustrating efforts to use the projects as pork. The fact that 
EIA happens early in project development makes its impact on pork more critical than 
other environmental regulations and activities that affect projects already in operation. 
 Since a systematic EIA requirement was introduced by the United States in 1969, 
it has become the most common environmental regulation worldwide. More than 170 
countries have some variant of it (Morgan 2012: 6). Brazil’s requirement came 
comparatively early for a developing country, in 1986. An agency of the Ministry of 
Environment, IBAMA, executes EIAs for projects that are very complex, expected to 
have large impacts, are placed in indigenous or conservation areas, or cross state 
boundaries.
7
 While environmental licensing is often contentious around the world, 
several characteristics of Brazilian licensing make it especially contentious (Hochstetler 
2011: 356-357). Its process requires three environmental licenses – for planning, for 
construction, and for operation – opening a larger number of veto points. As already 
noted, both environmental movements and the Ministério Público have targeted 
                                                 
7
 Law 7,804/1989, further detailed by Complementary Law 140/2011. 
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environmental licensing as a time when they can stall or stop projects. Finally, the 
original 1986 regulation and all revisions since require attention to social as well as 
environmental impacts, broadening the societal interest in participating in consultations 
and in using the process to demand compensation for affected communities.
8
 While the 
process has taken some time to master and is still carried out very unevenly in the 
Brazilian states, it has become a serious part of the initial permitting of economic projects 
there (Landim and Sánchez 2012). For example, the World Bank has calculated that 
payments for the socioenvironmental impacts of hydropower projects in Brazil now 
average 12% of total project costs (World Bank 2008: 10).  
 When Lula came into office in 2003, his administration was particularly 
concerned that 35 hydroelectric plants could not get EIAs completed in any form in a 
time of widespread electricity shortages.
9
 Lula’s response was to create a “Situation 
Room” (Sala de Situação) where first technical staff and then the ministers of 
infrastructure ministries sat down with the Ministry of Environment, Ibama, and the 
Ministério Público to try to work out strategies to create development that was both 
economically and environmentally sustainable. Dilma Rousseff, then Lula’s Minister of 
Mines and Energy, was a key participant. As president, she later used the Situation Room 
set-up routinely to work through the gargalos or bottlenecks to the PAC (Program for 
                                                 
8
 While there has been surprising little study of this process, it evidently introduces 
additional pork dimensions – but generally following local rather than presidential 
calculations. 
9
 Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na cerimônia de 
lançamento do programa de Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica 
(Proinfa) e do assinatura de Acordo de Cooperação Técnica entre os Ministérios de 
Minas e Energia e Meio Ambiente, no Palácio do Planalto, 30 March 2004, Brasília. 
Online at www.itamaraty.gov.br/portugues/politica_externa/discursos, accessed 8 April 
2004, in possession of author. 
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Growth Acceleration, Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento) infrastructure projects 
she had inherited from Lula and further developed. Some of those same long-stalled 
hydroelectric plants, like Belo Monte and Santo Antonio, were given their own 
permanent Situation Rooms.
10
 
 Lula did not disparage the environmental licensing process in his first years in 
office, nor did he speak of pork in describing the Situation Rooms. In describing the 
Situation Room for infrastructure, he went out of his way to explain that environmental 
licensing came from the national legislature and was not something Marina Silva had 
dreamed up, comparing her to a “mother of a soccer referee” (mae de juiz de futebol).11 
He noted the ability of “any citizen, of any municipality, to go to the Ministério Público 
and block the project as it waits for years and years in the queue”, saying this called for 
doing environmental licensing well. But he left no doubt that his final aim was to enable 
a strong Ibama to “approve projects in the national interest, in the interests of 
businessmen, and, above all, in the sovereign interest of our country.” This framing 
worked well with Marina Silva’s initiatives to regularize and improve the skills of those 
who worked for the Ministry of Environment, including Ibama. When she became 
Minister, only three or four of Ibama’s analysts were permanent employees, but she hired 
some 90 permanent analysts,
12
 a number which had risen to 400-450 by 2014. All have 
passed through a formal concurso, or competition, to gain employment.
13
 
 Even a more professional licensing corps did not approve licenses at the rate 
                                                 
10
 Interview with Celso Knijnik, Diretor do Programa de Energia do PAC, Secretaria do 
PAC, Ministério de Planejamento, Brasilia 23 September 2014. 
11
 Discurso do Presidente da República… 
12
 Interview with former technical staff member of IBAMA, Brasília, June 2009. 
13
 Interview with Alessandra Toledo, Former Coordinator de Energia Elétrica, Nuclear e 
Dutos – Coend, Ibama, Brasilia, 28 September 2014. 
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political actors wanted, and the issue festered through the rest of Lula’s time in office. In 
2005, Ibama issued new guidelines (Instrução Normativa 065/2005) that set a tighter 
timetable for the various steps of licensing hydropower and introduced a new online 
application process. These were extended to all of Ibama’s licensing projects in 2008 
(Instrução Normativa 184/2008). In a related development, all licensing documents since 
2005 are available online, from the original terms of reference to questions posed by 
Ibama and the company responses. The most complex processes have hundreds of 
documents posted, which can run to thousands of pages.
14
 This is an extraordinary 
resource for those actors who might want to challenge the projects, but it was justified as 
increasing the efficiency of the process since objections can come earlier in the process 
rather than halting advanced projects.
15
  
 Struggles over the licensing of projects continued, with energy sector executives, 
Lula, and Marina Silva trading especially sharp words around the licensing of 
hydropower.
16
 These formed a central part of the PAC, the Lula administration’s 
industrial policy program to try to kindle faster growth in his second term. Lula wanted 
special licensing treatment for PAC projects, which Silva resisted (Folha de São Paulo 
26 April 2007). CONAMA has historically set regulations like the licensing rules, 
making direct presidential influence difficult since CONAMA was numerically 
dominated by representatives of the states, civil society, and others not controlled by the 
presidency. Licenses for the Rio Madera plants (Santo Antônio and Jirau) were issued in 
July 2007 with many conditions and were one of the major blows that led to Silva’s 
                                                 
14
 http://www.ibama.gov.br/licenciamento/index.php.  
15
 Interview with former technical staff member of IBAMA, Brasília, June 2009.  
16
 For example, Valor Econômico 17 January 2007; Estado de São Paulo 20 and 21 April 
2007. 
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resignation the following year (Nunes and Peña 2015). 
 Taking office to replace Silva, Carlos Minc said he would make licensing 
processes both more rigorous and less bureaucratic (Jornal do Brasil 16 May 2008). 
Shortly after, he issued new rules that cut the average time frame from two years to 13 
months. Inside Ibama, Minc was perceived as a return to a normal, pre-Marina politics, 
where Ibama’s analysts were pressured to approve projects from inside as well as outside 
the Ministry.
17
 Yet Minc also tangled with the road and energy ministries, supporting 
licensing decisions against some of their projects, before acquiescing in the first approval 
for the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam, probably the most contentious infrastructure 
project ever in Brazil (Bratman 2014; Hochstetler 2011). Ibama’s General Coordinator of 
Electricity Infrastructure, Leozildo Tabajara da Silva Benjamin, told newspapers that he 
was pressured to resign because he resisted approving the project (Estado de São Paulo 4 
December 2009). It also was approved with many conditions. 
 Minc’s replacement, Izabella Teixeira, also began to work immediately to reduce 
the licensing time frames. As Rousseff’s new government set up the Situation Rooms to 
ensure steady advancement of the PAC’s projects, representatives of Ibama were 
frequently called to discuss environmental licensing bottlenecks. A participant found the 
meetings to be very high pressure, but observed that they were also a good opportunity to 
show the group what was actually holding up the license: the developer might not have 
submitted documents, or the indigenous agency FUNAI might not yet have made its 
report. Over time, PAC coordinators themselves started to be able to recognize the nature 
and variety of the problems that came from licensing instead of seeing a recalcitrant black 
                                                 
17
 Interview with former technical staff member of IBAMA. 
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box.
18
 Ibama is the entry and exit points for an environmental license, but the process 
itself depends on technical reports that come from a variety of agencies. The final 
decisions are made by top political appointees in Ibama, and may go against technical 
recommendations. The PAC rules explicitly gave such superpowers to the head of Ibama 
for PAC projects (Estado de São Paulo 27 October 2010), and most infrastructure 
projects are now by default included as PAC projects.
19
 
 Teixeira spearheaded other institutional developments inside the Ministry that 
shifted powers and processes in ways often missed by outsiders. An interministerial 
declaration (Portaria Interministerial 419/2011) and a Complementary Law (Lei 
Complementar 140/2011) made clearer divisions among federal, state, and municipal 
environmental responsibilities. Since the Ministério Público’s frequently targeted 
jurisdictions in its challenges, clarifying responsibilities blocked one line of objection. 
More critically, the same Complementary Law also stripped CONAMA of much of the 
power it had held since 1981 by giving its tasks to a National Tripartite Commission 
(Comissão Tripartite Nacional) that has parity membership of federal, state, and 
municipal agencies – without mentioning it openly.20 The old CONAMA, dominated by 
state environmental agencies and with substantial civil society participation, now handles 
only issues that are broadly relevant to the states, for example, new procedures for 
licensing wind power plants since those are licensed almost exclusively at the state level. 
There is no civil society representation in the Tripartite Commission. This move makes it 
much easier for the federal government to set rules that favor its version of environmental 
                                                 
18
 Interview Toledo. 
19
 Interview Knijnik. 
20
 Interview with official in the Ministry of the Environment, Brasília, September, 2014. 
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licensing. In this way, some of the tools that have made the Ministry of Environment and 
its licensing agency more independent of, and even antagonistic to, the executive’s pork-
led coalition management strategies have become duller.  
Conclusion 
 As scholars of presidentialism would expect, Brazilian environmental policy and 
outcomes did change quite a bit between the three presidential administrations from 2003 
to2014. An innovative and very successful policy to control deforestation was weakened, 
especially with the presidential transition between Lula and Rousseff, and the results 
show in a leveling off of the drop in deforestation that had lasted eight years. Even 
between Lula’s two terms, his decision to reorient his government to favor large 
infrastructure and energy projects in his second term brought changes. Many of these 
changes associated with presidential visions took place through successive choices of 
Ministers of the Environment who had steadily weaker ties with environmental activists 
over the three administrations. 
 The importance of pork for coalitional presidentialism showed up in all three 
administrations, as all were marked by significant conflict over the environmental 
licensing process. Regulations were steadily revised to reduce the ability of the Ministry 
of Environment, environmental activists, and the Ministério Público to block these 
important facilitators of coalition building (and personal and partisan enrichment, as the 
Lava Jato corruption trials show). At the same time, the environmental policy area does 
show some independence from presidents and coalitional presidentialism due to the 
countervailing pressures and resources of non-state actors. 
 Global comparative studies would miss many of these changes. EIA might have 
 22 
been weakened and accelerated, but it continued to exist as a regulation that was 
comparatively strong in international terms. The innovative deforestation policies did not 
go away and would still be counted in a comparative study; they just had less resources 
and (so far) still control deforestation in ways that Brazil historically could not. In many 
ways, this close view of Brazil and the more distant view of the comparative studies show 
the opposite virtues of qualitative and quantitative policy studies. The qualitative case 
study does show important historical variations, but they are still of less amplitude than 
the difference between, say, the forest policies of Brazil, Russia, and the Congo. Both of 
those views are important – and coalitional presidentialism appears to help account for 
the Brazilian modulations. 
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